higgsfield-product-photoshoot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to download and execute a shell script from a remote URL (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh) using the curl | sh pattern. This executes external code on the user's system without prior verification.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the higgsfield CLI tool by interpolating user-provided text into shell command arguments, specifically for the --prompt flag. This direct interpolation into a shell command environment creates a risk of command injection.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup process requires downloading an installation script from an external GitHub organization (higgsfield-ai).
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its handling of user data.
- Ingestion points: User responses from the pre-generation interview (e.g., product descriptions, mood, and styles) are used as arguments for the --prompt flag in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Arguments are enclosed in double quotes.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute system commands and manage image uploads.
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the user-provided prompt strings is implemented before they are executed in the shell environment.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata