skillify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates TypeScript code (
script.tsandscript.test.ts) by synthesizing logic from the agent's recent conversation history and executes it. - Evidence: Step 8 invokes
bun test script.test.tsor$B skill testagainst a temporary directory containing the dynamically generated files. - Evidence: Step 7 and Step 10 involve writing executable logic to the local file system and subsequently committing it to a permanent execution path.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell-level commands to interact with the environment, capture web data, and manage the local skill registry.
- Evidence: Step 4 executes
$B gotoand$B htmlto capture snapshots of external websites. - Evidence: Step 11 runs
$B skill runto verify the functionality of the synthesized script. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it uses previous conversation data (which may include content from scraped websites) as the source for code synthesis.
- Ingestion points: Conversation history (up to 10 agent turns) and previous
/scrapetool outputs (SKILL.md, Step 1 and Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill attempts to locate specific intent lines but lacks robust delimiters to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the synthesis.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write files (Step 7) and execute code via the Bun runtime (Step 8).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the conversation content before it is interpolated into the executable TypeScript template.
Audit Metadata