skills/opencue/skills/skillify/Gen Agent Trust Hub

skillify

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates TypeScript code (script.ts and script.test.ts) by synthesizing logic from the agent's recent conversation history and executes it.
  • Evidence: Step 8 invokes bun test script.test.ts or $B skill test against a temporary directory containing the dynamically generated files.
  • Evidence: Step 7 and Step 10 involve writing executable logic to the local file system and subsequently committing it to a permanent execution path.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell-level commands to interact with the environment, capture web data, and manage the local skill registry.
  • Evidence: Step 4 executes $B goto and $B html to capture snapshots of external websites.
  • Evidence: Step 11 runs $B skill run to verify the functionality of the synthesized script.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it uses previous conversation data (which may include content from scraped websites) as the source for code synthesis.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history (up to 10 agent turns) and previous /scrape tool outputs (SKILL.md, Step 1 and Step 3).
  • Boundary markers: The skill attempts to locate specific intent lines but lacks robust delimiters to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the synthesis.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write files (Step 7) and execute code via the Bun runtime (Step 8).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the conversation content before it is interpolated into the executable TypeScript template.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 03:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skillify