odl-fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external data from GitHub issues, comments, and attachments which are potentially attacker-controlled.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches data in Phase 1 Step 3 using
gh issue viewand downloads external attachments in Phase 1 Step 4. - Boundary markers: Rule 10 explicitly instructs the agent to treat outside text as data and to ignore instructions contained within it.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
bash,ghCLI,curl,maven,python,uv, andpnpmto perform its tasks. - Sanitization: Rule 10 requires the agent to wrap user-provided option values in single quotes to prevent shell injection, and Phase 1 Step 4 includes a script to verify that attachment URLs belong to trusted GitHub domains.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a wide range of shell commands, build tools (Maven, pnpm), and project scripts.
- Evidence: The workflow involves running
mvn,uv, and various repository scripts (e.g.,scripts/build-java.sh,scripts/test-node.sh) that incorporate parameters sourced from GitHub issues. - Mitigation: The skill mandates human-in-the-loop approval for all GitHub writes and provides strict formatting rules (Rule 10) for shell commands to prevent command injection.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches dependencies and artifacts from remote sources.
- Evidence: Downloads occur from
github.com,pypi.org,npmjs.org, and specialized repositories likeartifactory.openpreservation.orgfor tool dependencies. Attachment downloads are restricted to GitHub-owned domains in Phase 1 Step 4.
Audit Metadata