duoduo-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates a vulnerability surface where an LLM-powered 'Brain job' processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
duoduo session notifymessages, as described inSKILL.mdand the 'Mechanical layer' section ofreferences/pattern-mechanical-brain.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not provide or recommend the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags or backticks) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings to isolate external data from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The 'Brain job' is designed to use powerful tools, including
Bash(shell execution) andWebFetch(network operations), as detailed in the 'Optional SDK configuration keys' section ofreferences/pattern-mechanical-brain.md. - Sanitization: There are no instructions or examples for sanitizing, validating, or filtering external content before it is interpolated into the brain job's prompt.
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