github-pr-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub pull requests, including titles, descriptions, and comments, and provides this content to an AI agent with write-access permissions to the repository's pull requests.
- Ingestion points: PR metadata (title, body, labels) and linked issue content collected in
scripts/main.pyandscripts/worker.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses standard string blocks with headers and
---delimiters to isolate external content from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The AI agent is provided with
terminalandfile_editortools, and a GitHub token with write access to pull requests and issues. - Sanitization: The skill includes strong negative constraints in the prompt (e.g., "Do not modify files, push commits, or merge the pull request") and implements a "Scope Gate" to validate the PR's purpose before detailed technical review.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The automation downloads repository content as compressed tarballs from GitHub's official API to facilitate analysis.
- Evidence:
urllib.requestis used inscripts/main.pyto fetch current-head archives fromapi.github.com. - Safety Measures: The script explicitly validates the archive layout, rejects absolute or parent-directory (
..) paths to prevent traversal, and skips device files and symlinks to prevent platform escape. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The automation involves executing shell commands in the agent's workspace to handle repository setup and testing.
- Evidence: The prompt instructs the agent to use
gh(GitHub CLI) for metadata fetching andgitfor branch management within a profile-scoped environment. - Evidence: The setup workflow in
SKILL.mdprovides shell snippets for users to package and upload the automation to the platform.
Audit Metadata