github-repo-monitor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issue and pull request comments. This creates a surface where an external attacker could attempt to influence the agent's behavior through malicious comments.
- Ingestion points: In
scripts/main.py, the functions_poll_issue_commentsand_get_issue_contextingest untrusted text from the GitHub API. - Boundary markers: The skill provides a mitigation by explicitly instructing the agent in
_build_initial_prompt(withinscripts/main.py) to treat user-provided content as data/requests rather than instructions that override the system prompt. - Capability inventory: When in
implementmode, the responding agent is granted powerful capabilities, includingterminalandfile_editoraccess, as defined in the_get_agent_dictfunction. - Sanitization: Untrusted data is wrapped in
---delimiters within the generated prompt to differentiate it from instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process described in
SKILL.mdrequires the agent to execute several shell commands, includingcurlfor API verification,tarfor packaging the automation, andmkdirfor managing build directories. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The automation script (
scripts/main.py) performs frequent network operations to the GitHub API (api.github.com) to retrieve comment data. It also communicates with the internal OpenHands automation backend and KV store for state management.
Audit Metadata