github-repo-monitor

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issue and pull request comments. This creates a surface where an external attacker could attempt to influence the agent's behavior through malicious comments.
  • Ingestion points: In scripts/main.py, the functions _poll_issue_comments and _get_issue_context ingest untrusted text from the GitHub API.
  • Boundary markers: The skill provides a mitigation by explicitly instructing the agent in _build_initial_prompt (within scripts/main.py) to treat user-provided content as data/requests rather than instructions that override the system prompt.
  • Capability inventory: When in implement mode, the responding agent is granted powerful capabilities, including terminal and file_editor access, as defined in the _get_agent_dict function.
  • Sanitization: Untrusted data is wrapped in --- delimiters within the generated prompt to differentiate it from instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process described in SKILL.md requires the agent to execute several shell commands, including curl for API verification, tar for packaging the automation, and mkdir for managing build directories.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The automation script (scripts/main.py) performs frequent network operations to the GitHub API (api.github.com) to retrieve comment data. It also communicates with the internal OpenHands automation backend and KV store for state management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 07:36 PM