iterate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
ghCLI andgitto automate PR management. - Evidence includes commands for creating PRs, checking CI status (
gh pr checks), rerunning failed jobs (gh run rerun), and managing review threads via GraphQL and REST APIs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include directives for the agent to operate with a high degree of autonomy.
- The skill explicitly instructs the agent: "Do not stop to ask the user whether to continue polling; continue autonomously until a strict stop condition is met or the user interrupts."
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (PR comments and CI logs) which could be used as an indirect prompt injection vector.
- Ingestion points: PR reviews, inline comments, and QA reports are fetched via
gh pr viewandgh apicalls (documented inSKILL.mdSteps 3 and 4). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instruction-isolation warnings are present when the agent processes this external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to perform file writes,
gitcommits/pushes, and execute shell commands to "fix code" based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the comments before the agent acts upon them.
- Mitigation: The skill includes logic to filter reviews only from trusted sources (
OWNER,MEMBER,COLLABORATOR) or recognized bot accounts (openhands,all-hands-bot), significantly reducing the attack surface.
Audit Metadata