gitcode-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the user or agent to store GitCode personal access tokens in a plain-text configuration file at
~/.config/gitcode-cli/config.json. Additionally, the provided automation script ingitcode-pr-workflow.mdrecommends embedding the authentication token directly into the Git remote URL (e.g.,https://{username}:{token}@gitcode.com/...). This practice can lead to credential leakage in shell history, logs, or the.git/configfile, even though a warning is provided. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
@oh-gc/clipackage from the NPM registry. This is a third-party dependency necessary for the skill's functionality, but it introduces a supply chain risk as it is not an officially vetted or well-known service tool from the trusted list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on shell command execution to interact with the GitCode API and the local file system. The
gitcode-pr-workflow.mdfile contains a complex shell script that performs automated Git operations, CLI configuration, and PR creation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external GitCode repositories, such as issue descriptions, pull request comments, and commit messages.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through commands like
oh-gc issue viewandoh-gc pr list(found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the ingested repository content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities to write to the file system, modify repository settings, and perform network operations via the
oh-gcCLI (found inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested content before it is processed by the agent.
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