gitcode-pr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a series of shell commands and scripts to manage remotes, branches, and GitCode operations.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using dynamic variables derived from the local environment and remote repository metadata. Evidence: Variables such as
$BRANCH_NAME,$FORK_OWNER, and$ISSUE_NUMBERare interpolated into shell commands (e.g.,git push -u $FORK_REMOTE <branch-name>andsedoperations). If these values (especially branch names) contain shell metacharacters, they could facilitate command injection attacks when executed by the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository environment, which is then used in security-sensitive operations.
- Ingestion points: Data is collected from
git log(commit messages),git diff(code changes), and remote PR templates fetched viagit show $UPSTREAM_REMOTE/master:.gitee/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.zh-CN.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore" instructions for processing these external inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network operations via
git push, and modify repository state throughgitcodeMCP tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested strings before they are used as parameters for creating issues or pull requests.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content from remote repositories to populate PR templates. Evidence: The workflow attempts to retrieve
.gitee/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.zh-CN.mdfrom the upstream OpenHarmony repository usinggit fetchandgit showif a local copy is not present.
Audit Metadata