gitcode-pr

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a series of shell commands and scripts to manage remotes, branches, and GitCode operations.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using dynamic variables derived from the local environment and remote repository metadata. Evidence: Variables such as $BRANCH_NAME, $FORK_OWNER, and $ISSUE_NUMBER are interpolated into shell commands (e.g., git push -u $FORK_REMOTE <branch-name> and sed operations). If these values (especially branch names) contain shell metacharacters, they could facilitate command injection attacks when executed by the agent.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository environment, which is then used in security-sensitive operations.
  • Ingestion points: Data is collected from git log (commit messages), git diff (code changes), and remote PR templates fetched via git show $UPSTREAM_REMOTE/master:.gitee/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.zh-CN.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore" instructions for processing these external inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network operations via git push, and modify repository state through gitcode MCP tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested strings before they are used as parameters for creating issues or pull requests.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content from remote repositories to populate PR templates. Evidence: The workflow attempts to retrieve .gitee/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.zh-CN.md from the upstream OpenHarmony repository using git fetch and git show if a local copy is not present.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 02:24 AM