aris-auto-review-loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes full
Bash(*)access to implement code changes, execute experiments, and run thecodex exectool. In its most adversarial mode, it instructs an external model to explore the repository freely using shell execution.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the file~/.claude/feishu.jsonto configure external notifications. Reading configuration or credential files from hidden directories in the user's home folder is a significant data exposure risk.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection as it automatically implements code modifications suggested by an external AI model.\n - Ingestion points: Responses from the
mcp__codex__codextool and theAUTO_REVIEW.mdlog file.\n - Boundary markers: None; instructions are treated as verified tasks for implementation.\n
- Capability inventory: Access to
Bash(*),Write, andEdittools allows for arbitrary file and system modifications.\n - Sanitization: The skill lacks any sanitization or verification mechanism for the code changes suggested by the external model.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows the
$ARGUMENTSvariable to override critical constants likeHUMAN_CHECKPOINT. This enables the execution of the autonomous loop without any user intervention or review of the proposed changes.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests usingcurlto fetch research citations fromdblp.organddoi.org.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata