The Agent Skills Directory

[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests broad Bash(*) permissions and explicitly utilizes shell heredocs as a fallback mechanism for writing files when standard tools fail. This provides a capability for arbitrary file creation and potential script execution within the environment.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external peer reviews.
Ingestion points: Raw reviewer comments are loaded from external text, PDFs, or markdown files into the agent's active context during Phase 1.
Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear structural delimiters (such as XML tags or unique separators) to isolate untrusted reviewer text from the skill's own logic.
Capability inventory: The skill has access to high-privilege tools including Bash(*), Write, Edit, and the ability to trigger external agents or skills like /aris-experiment-bridge.
Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for filtering, escaping, or sanitizing the reviewer text to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent's behavior during the 'atomization' and 'strategy planning' phases.

aris-rebuttal