create-agent-tui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a
shelltool (sample/src/tools/shell.ts) and optional shell shortcut integrations (references/modules.md) that allow for arbitrary command execution. These features are standard for coding agent harnesses but represent a significant capability tier that must be managed carefully by the end developer. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a
js_repltool (references/tools.md) and useschild_processfor shell execution, enabling the runtime execution of code and commands within the generated agent project. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The generated agent infrastructure possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context via
file_read(sample/src/tools/file-read.ts),grep(sample/src/tools/grep.ts), andweb_fetch(references/tools.md). - Boundary markers: The default system prompt generated in
sample/src/config.tsdoes not include explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in external files or web content. - Capability inventory: The agent harness includes high-privilege capabilities such as
shell,file_write,file_edit, andsub_agentspawning across various tools and optional modules. - Sanitization: There is no documented implementation of prompt sanitization or escaping for content retrieved from external sources before it is interpolated into the conversation history.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a list of available models from the OpenRouter API via the
/modelcommand insample/src/commands.ts. This is a standard and expected feature for model selection within the vendor's ecosystem.
Audit Metadata