openrouter-typescript-sdk
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdincludes an example for acalculatorToolthat implements tool logic using theeval()function. This pattern is highly dangerous as it allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code from potentially untrusted input strings passed to the tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a framework for processing external model inputs and executing associated tools, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The
callModelfunction documented inSKILL.mdaccepts arbitrary strings and message arrays via theinputparameter. - Boundary markers: The SDK provides separate
instructions(system) andinput(user) parameters, but the examples do not demonstrate explicit delimitation or sanitization for third-party content. - Capability inventory: The SDK enables automatic tool execution via the
executemethod, network requests to OpenRouter API endpoints, and programmatic management of API keys. - Sanitization: The documentation encourages the use of Zod for tool input/output validation, which provides a layer of structural and schema-based enforcement.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions and documentation reference the installation of the
@openrouter/agentand@openrouter/sdkpackages from the NPM registry. These packages are the core functional components provided by the skill author for model integration.
Audit Metadata