trace-analytics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of trace data.
- Ingestion points: Trace data is retrieved from OpenSearch indices such as
otel-v1-apm-span-*andotel-v2-apm-service-map-*using PPL queries intraces.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or specific directives for the agent to distinguish between the trace data and its own system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute network requests via
curland specialized MCP tools likeGenericOpenSearchApiTool. - Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or filter the content of the traces (e.g., span attributes or exception messages) before they are presented to the agent.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses the vendor's own MCP server (
opensearch-mcp-server-py) and manages credentials through environment variables, which is a recommended practice for secret management. - [SAFE]: The skill suggests disabling SSL verification in some configurations (using
-kwith curl orOPENSEARCH_SSL_VERIFY: "false"). This is a security best practice violation that could expose the connection to interception, but it is documented as a configuration option for self-managed or local environments.
Audit Metadata