sn-ppt-creative
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data including user queries, document digests, and reference images which are then used to generate prompts for downstream AI models.
- Ingestion points:
info_pack.json(containinguser_queryanddocument_digest) and reference image paths are read in Stage 2, 3, and 4 inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
prompts/outline.mdandprompts/page_prompt.mdlack explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the user data. - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local deck directory and execute subprocesses (e.g.,
build_pptx.py,sn_agent_runner.py). - Sanitization: The skill includes a dedicated script
scripts/sanitize_prompt.pyand hard constraints inprompts/page_prompt.mdspecifically designed to strip technical metadata like hex codes, CSS units, and design labels to prevent them from being rendered in generated images. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdutilize shell command substitution and execution of local Python scripts to handle file processing and tool invocation. - Evidence: Stage 4.2 in
SKILL.mduses$(cat ...)to interpolate the content of prompt files into the command line for the image generation tool. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
python -csnippets to dynamically import shared libraries and execute logic involving interpolated environment variables and paths. - Evidence: Stage 2, 3, and 4.1 in
SKILL.mdusepython3 -cto invoke the sharedmodel_clientfor LLM and VLM operations.
Audit Metadata