investigate-alert

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes standard OpenShift and Kubernetes command-line tools (oc, kubectl) along with diagnostic utilities (jq, wget, python3, dig, nslookup, ip, ss, tcpdump, strace) to inspect the live cluster environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses wget to communicate with the internal Thanos/Prometheus API (thanos-querier route). The request includes the agent's authentication token and uses the --no-check-certificate flag, which is typical for interacting with internal cluster services using self-signed certificates.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The investigation protocol directs the agent to follow instructions found in runbook_url annotations within Prometheus alerting rules. This constitutes an ingestion point for potentially untrusted data that could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: runbook_url field in alerting rules, pod logs, event messages, and workload descriptions.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" prompts are used when processing external runbook content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to cluster metadata via oc, network tools via wget, and execution via python3 and bash scripts.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement explicit sanitization or filtering for content retrieved from external runbooks or pod logs before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 08:09 AM