investigate-alert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes standard OpenShift and Kubernetes command-line tools (
oc,kubectl) along with diagnostic utilities (jq,wget,python3,dig,nslookup,ip,ss,tcpdump,strace) to inspect the live cluster environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
wgetto communicate with the internal Thanos/Prometheus API (thanos-querierroute). The request includes the agent's authentication token and uses the--no-check-certificateflag, which is typical for interacting with internal cluster services using self-signed certificates. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The investigation protocol directs the agent to follow instructions found in
runbook_urlannotations within Prometheus alerting rules. This constitutes an ingestion point for potentially untrusted data that could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
runbook_urlfield in alerting rules, pod logs, event messages, and workload descriptions. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" prompts are used when processing external runbook content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to cluster metadata via
oc, network tools viawget, and execution viapython3andbashscripts. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement explicit sanitization or filtering for content retrieved from external runbooks or pod logs before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata