investigate-ci-failure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) by processing untrusted data generated during CI processes.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads build logs (
build-log.txt), job metadata (finished.json), and test results (junit_*.xml) from external storage buckets. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the content of these logs as untrusted data or to ignore instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes potentially powerful capabilities including shell command execution (
gh,gcloud), local file system writes (mktemp,gcloud storage cp), and network operations (WebFetch). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the logs or artifacts before they are processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches configuration, logs, and metadata from remote sources.
- Evidence: Downloads artifacts from
storage.googleapis.com/test-platform-results/andgcsweb-ci.apps.ci.l2s4.p1.openshiftapps.com/gcs/. These domains represent the official CI infrastructure for the OpenShift project. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands to interact with external services and manage local data.
- Evidence: Uses the
ghCLI for GitHub API interactions andgcloud storageorgsutilfor downloading large log files and directories to temporary local storage.
Audit Metadata