code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository, including git diffs, commit messages, and specification files, which are then passed into sub-agent prompts for analysis.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved via
git diff,git log, and file reads fromdocs/,specs/, or.scratch/(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when passing external content to the sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
gitcommands (diff, log, rev-parse) and file system reads to gather information. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is interpolated into the prompts for the Standards and Spec sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-supplied strings as arguments for shell-based commands like
git diff <fixed-point>...HEADandgit rev-parse <fixed-point>. If the underlying agent execution environment does not properly sanitize these inputs, a malicious user could attempt command injection by providing a crafted git reference (e.g., using command separators). However, the skill explicitly instructs the agent to validate the reference usinggit rev-parsebefore proceeding, which serves as a mitigation step.
Audit Metadata