apexlang-example-applications
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Hardcoded cryptographic salts used for session state protection were found in the application configuration files. While these are part of the application definition metadata, they represent sensitive configuration data that should be uniquely generated and managed as secrets in deployed environments.
- Evidence:
checksumSalt: 40ACB0916413E0771D12A103716D68895FC91CBBB406CAFA608646F1C885FCA0inassets/example-1/application.apx. - Evidence:
checksumSalt: B98FE33A52A9044B17595883F386B708F82408C0D23D099041CCF5BBF896CBB8inassets/example-2/application.apx. - Evidence:
checksumSalt: BE8E26C19CF3511FBFEB1A6F9F79DA741A84B7ED70299369E025F6E56E2FFF65inassets/example-0/application.apx. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The example applications include features that ingest and process untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection when these applications are viewed or manipulated by an AI agent.
- Ingestion points: Feedback submission forms (e.g.,
P10050_FEEDBACKinassets/example-1/pages/p10050-feedback.apx) and data loading via file upload (e.g.,P22_FILEinassets/example-2/pages/p00022-khaeld.apx). - Boundary markers: Data ingestion components lack specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts during processing.
- Capability inventory: The applications use platform APIs such as
apex_data_parser.parsefor processing external file content andAPEX_UTIL.SUBMIT_FEEDBACKfor data storage. - Sanitization: While some components explicitly use
apex_escape.htmlin display logic, the overall security posture relies on the underlying platform's default escaping mechanisms, which may be bypassed if specific item settings are configured (e.g.,format: htmlUnsafeused forP10054_RATING_ICONinassets/example-1/pages/p10054-feedback1.apx).
Audit Metadata