ara-rigor-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and semantically analyze external, user-provided research artifacts (ARAs) which include files like
PAPER.md,logic/claims.md, andtrace/exploration_tree.yaml. These files constitute an untrusted data surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions (e.g., hidden prompt injections) intended to hijack the agent's execution flow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads multiple user-controlled files from the artifact directory during Step 1 and Step 2 of its procedure (e.g.,
SKILL.mdlines 61-72). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters (like XML tags or triple backticks) or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the content of the research artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages
Read,Write,Glob, andGreptools (documented inSKILL.mdline 16), which could be abused to modify the filesystem if the agent is successfully injected. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the input data from the research artifacts before it is processed by the model's semantic reasoning engine.
Audit Metadata