ara-rigor-reviewer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and semantically analyze external, user-provided research artifacts (ARAs) which include files like PAPER.md, logic/claims.md, and trace/exploration_tree.yaml. These files constitute an untrusted data surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions (e.g., hidden prompt injections) intended to hijack the agent's execution flow.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Evidence Chain:
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads multiple user-controlled files from the artifact directory during Step 1 and Step 2 of its procedure (e.g., SKILL.md lines 61-72).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters (like XML tags or triple backticks) or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the content of the research artifacts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill leverages Read, Write, Glob, and Grep tools (documented in SKILL.md line 16), which could be abused to modify the filesystem if the agent is successfully injected.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the input data from the research artifacts before it is processed by the model's semantic reasoning engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 05:50 AM