gptq
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches pre-trained large language models and calibration datasets from Hugging Face's official infrastructure. These operations are essential for the quantization process and target well-known, trusted services.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include standard shell commands for environment setup (e.g.,
pip install auto-gptq) and model deployment via Docker. These are expected administrative tasks for configuring machine learning tools. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The troubleshooting documentation suggests using
sudo apt-get installto install system-level dependencies. While this involves elevated privileges, it is a standard practice for manual environment setup and is presented as a user-executed fix rather than an automated script behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external datasets for calibration.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context via the
load_datasetfunction when fetching calibration sets like C4 or ShareGPT inSKILL.mdandreferences/calibration.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the processed calibration data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform file system writes (
save_quantized), network operations (push_to_hub), and subprocess execution (pip install). - Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering or sanitizing the calibration text before it is used to calculate model weights.
Audit Metadata