grpo-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
run_test_casesfunction inexamples/reward_functions_library.pyuses the Pythonexec()built-in to run code provided as a string. This string is sourced from model completions during the training process via thecode_execution_rewardfunction. Executing dynamically generated code from untrusted sources (in this case, an LLM being optimized) is a dangerous pattern that can lead to host system compromise if the code is not properly sandboxed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its reward modeling logic.
- Ingestion points: The
completionsdata structure, containing generated text from the model under training, is ingested into thecode_execution_rewardfunction inexamples/reward_functions_library.py. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions to the execution environment to distinguish between intended code and malicious injection within the completions.
- Capability inventory: The training environment has the capability to execute arbitrary Python code via the
exec()function called withinrun_test_cases. - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering is performed on the extracted code block before it is passed to the execution function.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches datasets and pre-trained models from Hugging Face, including the
openai/gsm8kdataset and theQwen/Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instructandgoogle/gemma-3-1b-itmodels. These are standard resources from established organizations and well-known services used for machine learning development.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata