openrlhf-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation steps in
SKILL.mdrequire the user to runsudo pip uninstallfor several packages, which utilizes elevated system permissions. Additionally, the recommendeddocker runcommand uses the--cap-add=SYS_ADMINflag, granting the container extensive administrative capabilities on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/custom-rewards.mdfile defines an implementation pattern for code generation rewards that is vulnerable to indirect injection. - Ingestion points: The
reward_funclogic extractsgenerated_codedirectly from model-produced queries inreferences/custom-rewards.md. - Boundary markers: The examples use simple string manipulation (
query.split(prompt)[-1]) to isolate model output, which can be bypassed by adversarial content designed to escape the expected response structure. - Capability inventory: The script demonstrates using
subprocess.runto execute the extracted code viapytestand the Python interpreter. - Sanitization: The documentation lacks instructions or examples for sandboxing, resource limiting, or validating the model-generated code before execution.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
references/custom-rewards.mdprovides examples for dynamic code execution by writing strings to temporary files usingtempfile.NamedTemporaryFileand executing them as Python scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands for environment management and distributed task execution, including
ray start,ray job submit, anddeepspeedmodule invocations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata