sparse-autoencoder-training
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines workflows for training Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) that involve processing large external datasets, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection if the source data contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow 2) andreferences/api.mddescribe training configurations usingdataset_path="monology/pile-uncopyrighted"to ingest external content. - Boundary markers: The provided implementation templates do not use delimiters or explicit instructions to prevent the model from obeying instructions that might be embedded within the training corpus.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network operations via
SAE.from_pretrained(to fetch model artifacts from HuggingFace) and performing file system writes usingsae.save_modelto store trained weights. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or content validation for the data ingested during the training process, which is typical for library-focused research code but remains a risk factor.
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