continuous-learning-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection by having the agent store and later retrieve task outcomes and error logs.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads stored data from the
.claude/learnings/directory using scripts likepre-task.shand commands during the 'Weekly Synthesis Loop'. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when the agent retrieves past logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses local shell operations (
grep,cat,mkdir,echo) to manage the knowledge base. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization of logged content. Malicious instructions contained within external error messages or task data could be retrieved and followed by the agent in future sessions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts provided for task hooks (
post-task.sh,pre-task.sh) perform file and search operations without input validation. - Evidence: The scripts directly interpolate arguments into shell commands (e.g.,
grep -r "$1"andecho "... $1" >> ...). If the input strings contain shell-special characters or flags, it could result in argument injection or unintended shell behavior. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/learning-resources.mdfile contains a curated list of links to official documentation (e.g.,react.dev,docs.python.org) and well-known learning platforms.
Audit Metadata