deep-interview
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input during its interview rounds and incorporates it into a final specification file.
- Ingestion points: User responses are collected through the
AskUserQuestiontool or plain-text fallback during Stage 3 (S3) of the state machine. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses a structured markdown template for the final output, it does not explicitly define delimiters or sanitization routines for user-provided strings when they are interpolated into the plan.
- Capability inventory: The generated specification can be used by the agent to perform file operations (
Read,Edit,Write), execute shell commands (Bash), or delegate tasks to other subagents (task) as described in the handoff contracts. - Sanitization: The instructions do not describe specific sanitization or escaping of user-provided content before crystallization into the final plan.
- Analysis: This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if a user provides malicious instructions that are later executed during the 'execute' phase. However, because this data flow is the primary and intended purpose of the requirements-gathering skill, the risk is inherent to the design rather than a malicious addition.
Audit Metadata