obsidian-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of a host-installed
obsidianCLI tool to interact with the user's filesystem and running applications. It supports various commands for file operations, task management, and system inspection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes the
obsidian evalcommand, which allows the agent to execute arbitrary JavaScript code (code="...") within the execution context of the running Obsidian application. This is a high-risk capability as it can be used to bypass typical sandbox restrictions or perform actions on behalf of the user within the app. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: The agent reads untrusted data from the vault using
obsidian read,obsidian search, andobsidian dev:dom(which extracts text from the application's UI). - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or warnings are provided to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the content of the notes it reads.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write to the filesystem, execute arbitrary code via
eval, and take screenshots, providing multiple exploitation paths if it follows instructions embedded within a note. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from the vault before processing it.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
obsidian dev:screenshotcommand allows the agent to capture the visual state of the workspace and save it to a path (path=screenshot.png). This could be used to capture and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information visible in the Obsidian UI that is not easily accessible via text-based commands.
Audit Metadata