browser-devtools-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external, untrusted websites using tools like
mcp__playwright__browser_snapshotandmcp__playwright__browser_evaluate. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through accessibility snapshots and DOM inspection results in the
ScreenshotToCodeWorkflowandTokenExtractionWorkflowexamples inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates used to analyze this data (e.g., in
analyze_screenshot) do not utilize clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions within the captured snapshots. - Capability inventory: The skill instructions enable powerful capabilities including navigation (
browser_navigate), page interaction (browser_click,browser_type), and file system writes (browser_take_screenshotwith filename parameters). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is interpolated into LLM prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
mcp__playwright__browser_evaluateto execute JavaScript strings within a browser environment. The provided patterns demonstrate assembling these scripts as strings at runtime (e.g.,cdp_evaluateand the style extraction functions), which constitutes a dynamic execution surface within the browser context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute operations in a browser environment, including navigating to arbitrary URLs and performing interactions. If the agent were to encounter malicious instructions via an indirect prompt injection, these tools could be misused to perform unauthorized navigation or interactions on behalf of the user.
Audit Metadata