yc-batch-evaluator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external websites (Y Combinator and startup homepages) and processes this content using an LLM (Perplexity) to generate evaluations and rankings.
- Ingestion points: External content is fetched using the
scrapegraphtool fromycombinator.comand arbitrary startup URLs in Step 1, Step 3a, and Step 3b (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" warnings for the fetched content before it is interpolated into the Perplexity prompt in Step 3d.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write all processed data, including potential injection payloads, to a Google Sheet using the
google-sheetstool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content scraped from external sources before it is used for assessment.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from a wide variety of non-whitelisted external domains during the startup website scraping phase (Step 3b).
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses the Apollo tool with the
reveal_personal_emails: trueflag to harvest founder contact information. While this aligns with the skill's stated purpose for investment research, it involves the automated collection and storage of personal PII in a spreadsheet (SKILL.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (prefixed with
orth run) to invoke various API tools for scraping, data lookup, and spreadsheet management.
Audit Metadata