boxlang-testing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an integration where an AI agent consumes output from the TestBox framework, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if the application being tested produces malicious failure messages.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly recommends the
Agentreporter (--reporter=agent), which outputs test failure details in JSON format for agent consumption. It also highlights the 'Ask AI' feature in HTML reports which generates prompts based on failure data. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between the framework's report structure and potentially malicious content within the 'message' or 'stack' fields of a failure.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to use the BoxLang CLI (
./testbox/run) to execute tests, read failure results, and potentially modify the codebase or interact with external AI providers based on those results. - Sanitization: The skill does not mention any sanitization or validation of the test output before it is processed by the AI agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing shell commands, including a feature that allows running arbitrary commands to start web servers.
- Evidence: The documentation details the use of the
./testbox/runCLI and specifically the--web-serverflag, which executes a user-provided shell string (e.g.,--web-server="boxlang-miniserver --port 8080") before running tests.
Audit Metadata