autonomous-loops

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents an installation procedure for a third-party tool using a high-risk command: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh | bash. This pattern executes arbitrary remote code from a non-trusted source without integrity verification or user review.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple shell scripts (e.g., daily-dev.sh) that chain autonomous agent calls with filesystem modifications, Git operations, and build tool execution. These workflows provide a large attack surface for arbitrary code execution if the agent is manipulated.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architectures for "Continuous Claude" and "RFC-Driven DAG" are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads from SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md, RFC documents, and PRD files in the local repository.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or safety delimiters are defined in the provided script examples or instructions to isolate untrusted file content.
  • Capability inventory: The loops possess capabilities for file writing, shell command execution via bash, and Git repository management through the gh CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing external input or validating specification files before they are interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 11:08 PM