autonomous-loops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents an installation procedure for a third-party tool using a high-risk command:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh | bash. This pattern executes arbitrary remote code from a non-trusted source without integrity verification or user review. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple shell scripts (e.g.,
daily-dev.sh) that chain autonomous agent calls with filesystem modifications, Git operations, and build tool execution. These workflows provide a large attack surface for arbitrary code execution if the agent is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architectures for "Continuous Claude" and "RFC-Driven DAG" are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md, RFC documents, and PRD files in the local repository. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or safety delimiters are defined in the provided script examples or instructions to isolate untrusted file content.
- Capability inventory: The loops possess capabilities for file writing, shell command execution via
bash, and Git repository management through theghCLI. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing external input or validating specification files before they are interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata