skill-shed
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
git cloneand the GitHub API (gh api) to download content from the external repositoryOruga420/claude-code-skills. These operations fetch unvetted data into the local environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides automated workflows to download remote files and move them into the
~/.claude/skills/directory. Since skills can contain executable components or complex instructions, this mechanism facilitates the persistent installation of remote code into the agent's runtime environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to manage the local environment and interact with GitHub, including
ls,git clone,cp, andgh api. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and applying remote content directly into the agent's context without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: GitHub API (
gh api) and Git (git clone) are used to fetch content fromOruga420/claude-code-skills. - Boundary markers: None identified. Content fetched via the API is decoded and applied directly to the conversation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
ls,git clone,cp,gh api) and file system manipulation within the agent's configuration folders. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote skill content is performed before application or installation.
Audit Metadata