ticket-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for repository state tracking and task verification. Evidence includes:
- Use of
git branch --show-currentandgit rev-parse HEADto manage context. - Execution of a "repo verify belt" command, which is dynamically determined by reading repository documentation like
AGENTS.mdorREADME.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its core function relies on processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The "Recap" section instructs the agent to "materialize each spec (fetch URL / issue / file)" provided by the user.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses headers such as
SPEC (materialized; this IS the spec for code-review):to delimit content in sub-agent prompts, but does not provide explicit instructions to ignore instructions embedded within those specs. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator spawns sub-agents with the ability to write code, execute git commands, and run verification scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the materialized spec text before it is passed to the child agents.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles the environment for its sub-agents by reading and pasting the full content of other skill files (
implement,code-review, andtdd) located in~/.cursor/skills/. This makes the behavior of the orchestrator dependent on the current state of those external files. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads internal configuration and skill definition files from the user's home directory (
~/.cursor/skills/) to perform its orchestration duties.
Audit Metadata