writing-internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large amounts of data from external company tools (Slack, Google Drive, Email, Calendar) to summarize them into internal communications. This creates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection, where malicious instructions hidden in a Slack message or a document could influence the agent's behavior during the summarization or drafting process.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to read from Slack channels, Google Drive documents, Emails, and Calendar events to gather context for 3P updates, newsletters, and FAQs.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific boundary markers (like XML tags or clear delimiters) to separate the untrusted data from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill primarily performs text processing and summarization. It does not appear to write back to sensitive files or execute code, which limits the impact of a potential injection.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering instructions are provided for the content retrieved from these external tools.
Audit Metadata