herdr-orchestration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
herdrCLI to perform orchestration tasks. It dynamically constructs and runs shell commands likeherdr agent start,herdr agent prompt, andherdr pane splitto manage worker agents across different panes and tabs. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions in
references/agent-launch.mdexplicitly direct the host agent to launch worker agents with posture flags that bypass security controls. Evidence includes the use of--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude agents and--yolo --sandbox disabledfor Cursor agents, which intentionally removes standard safety boundaries for sub-processes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration dispatch loop creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by integrateing untrusted data from worker agents.
- Ingestion points: Step 3 of the Dispatch Loop in
SKILL.mdreads worker agent output usingherdr agent read <name> --source recent-unwrapped. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions when processing this worker output, making the host agent susceptible to influence by a worker's transcript.
- Capability inventory: The host agent possesses significant capabilities, including prompting other agents, creating and closing panes, and writing to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from worker agents before it is integrado into the host agent's decision-making logic.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains a session ledger at
${XDG_STATE_HOME:-$HOME/.local/state}/herdr-orchestration/<run-key>.mdto track active agent IDs and workstream states across the orchestration session. While used for coordination, it represents a persistent record of the run's resources on the host filesystem.
Audit Metadata