herdr-orchestration

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly mandates the use of command-line flags that bypass built-in security controls, permission prompts, and sandboxes for worker agents.
  • In the references/agent-launch.md file, the skill configures the claude agent with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag, which is described as bypassing all permission checks.
  • The cursor agent is configured with the flags --yolo --sandbox disabled, which force-allows commands and removes environment isolation.
  • SKILL.md instructs the agent to use these flags for every worker in the run, effectively granting sub-agents autonomous and unrestricted access to the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive execution of the herdr CLI and various agent binaries to manage tabs, panes, and worker lifecycles.
  • SKILL.md contains numerous shell command patterns for creating workspaces (herdr tab create), running agents (herdr agent start), and interacting with process output (herdr agent read).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration workflow establishes an attack surface where a compromised worker agent could influence the host agent's behavior during the integration phase.
  • Ingestion points: The host agent (Control Tower) is instructed to read results and status from workers using herdr agent get and herdr agent read (SKILL.md, Step 3 & 4).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific requirements for using delimiters or boundary markers when processing worker-generated text, which could contain hidden instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The host agent possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to split panes, execute arbitrary shell commands via sub-agents, and modify the local file system during output integration.
  • Sanitization: The dispatch loop (Step 4) requires the host to "Integrate accepted output" and "resolve interactions" but provides no guidance on sanitizing or filtering instructions embedded in that output.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 10:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — herdr-orchestration