delegate-chore
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest project files and user instructions to generate task requests for subagents (e.g., Claude Haiku). This creates a pipeline where untrusted data from the codebase can influence subagent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/run.shandscripts/prepare.shreceive Markdown task definitions containing objectives, scope, and context via stdin. - Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers to structure requests, but the provided Bash shims do not perform explicit escaping or sanitization of content passed to the subagent.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute Bash and Node.js; subagents invoked by this skill typically possess capabilities for file system manipulation and command execution.
- Sanitization: Not visible in the shell scripts; sanitization logic is likely deferred to the
delegate-cli.mjstool which is not provided for analysis. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies entirely on the execution of a Node.js CLI tool (
delegate-cli.mjs) through a series of Bash wrappers. - Evidence: Every script in the
scripts/directory (e.g.,run.sh,dispatch.sh,prepare.sh) usesexec nodeto invoke the underlying logic. While this is the intended design, it requires the environment to have Node.js 24+ installed and grants the skill the ability to run arbitrary JavaScript logic via the Node.js runtime.
Audit Metadata