delegate-htmldoc

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality is delegated to a JavaScript file named delegate-cli.mjs. This file is invoked by almost every script in the package (e.g., run.sh, prepare.sh, dispatch.sh, htmldoc-permalink.sh) using node. However, the source code for delegate-cli.mjs is not provided in the skill files, representing an unverifiable execution of bundled code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Bash to execute multiple internal scripts that wrap the Node.js execution. While the wrappers themselves are simple, they pass all command-line arguments directly to the hidden delegate-cli.mjs tool, which performs complex tasks like dispatching subagents and resolving models.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (Markdown requests) to generate HTML documents. While references/styleguide.md prohibits the inclusion of JavaScript in generated content, the tool scripts/htmldoc-permalink.sh is explicitly designed to perform content injection into the generated HTML files. This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded or manipulated.
  • Ingestion points: stdin for scripts/run.sh and scripts/prepare.sh.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown section headers (Objective, Scope, Context) to delimit input.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including Bash script execution, file reading (Read), and user interaction (AskUserQuestion).
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions to prevent JavaScript generation by subagents, but provides an automated tool for post-generation injection.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 01:48 AM