subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a multi-agent orchestration pipeline where information moves from exploration and research roles to implementation and testing roles.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through user requests and via research agents that explore codebases or gather project context (referenced in
SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: While the skill manages handoffs via explicit prompts, it does not define specific boundary delimiters or isolation instructions to ensure the orchestrator treats subagent-provided data as untrusted.\n
- Capability inventory: The coordination system dispatches agents with roles capable of modifying the filesystem (coding role) and executing tests (testing role), providing an execution path for instructions that might be embedded in research summaries.\n
- Sanitization: The skill's instructions do not describe sanitization, escaping, or validation procedures for content passed between agents in the pipeline.
Audit Metadata