code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from various sources to define the code review specifications.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads pull request descriptions, Git commit messages, and specification files located in directories such as
docs/,specs/, and.scratch/. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate these external inputs or warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes Git commands, reads local files, and delegates tasks to sub-agents for parallel processing.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or filtering of the content retrieved from external metadata or documentation files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands to gather the necessary context for the review process.
- Evidence: The workflow explicitly calls for executing
git diff,git status, andgit logcommands to identify changes and project history. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to fetch pull request and issue data using external tracker integrations (e.g., GitHub or GitLab via
issue-tracker.mdlogic). - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill references a setup command
/setup-ouyangjiahong-skillsin the boundary cases table, which is an external vendor-specific tool used for configuration.
Audit Metadata