dispatch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and uses it to generate prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads task content from GitHub issue bodies via the
gh issue viewcommand and from local markdown files (SKILL.md, lines 14-25). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to sub-agents to ignore embedded commands within the ingested task data.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agents (referenced in
references/harness-*.md) utilize powerful tools such asAgent,Workflow, andactorwhich possess filesystem read/write capabilities. - Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or filtering of the external content before interpolating it into sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (
gh issue view) to fetch issue data from remote repositories. While GitHub is a trusted service, the output is treated as instructional data for other agents. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic execution patterns to orchestrate sub-agents on specific platforms.
- Script Generation: In
references/harness-claude-code.mdandreferences/harness-mimo-code.md, the skill generates inline JavaScript orchestration scripts at runtime to manage task concurrency and dependencies. - Execution Method: These scripts are executed via platform-native
Workfloworworkflowtools. While the scripts follow fixed templates, they incorporate external task data via string interpolation.
Audit Metadata