grpo-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
run_test_casesfunction inexamples/reward_functions_library.pyuses the Pythonexec()function to execute code strings. These strings are sourced fromcode_execution_reward, which processes untrusted completions from the model being trained. Executing dynamically generated code without isolation is a significant security risk.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to feed model-generated completions directly into an execution environment.\n - Ingestion points: The
completionsparameter incode_execution_reward(inexamples/reward_functions_library.py).\n - Boundary markers: None are present to prevent the execution of malicious logic within the extracted code.\n
- Capability inventory: The use of
exec()provides comprehensive access to Python's execution capabilities.\n - Sanitization: The
extract_code_blockfunction identifies code sections via regex but does not perform any security validation or content filtering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Arbitrary Python code execution viaexec()allows the training process to perform system-level operations, including running shell commands or modifying the filesystem, if the model generates such code.\n- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an inconsistency in authorship; the skill's files claim it is maintained by 'Orchestra Research' and link to 'orchestra.com', whereas the actual skill author is identified as 'ovachiever'. This can mislead users regarding the skill's origin.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata