tensorrt-llm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides tools and code examples for serving LLMs that process untrusted user prompts, which creates a potential surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
promptsargument inllm.generate()calls (found inSKILL.mdandreferences/optimization.md) and through the/v1/chat/completionsAPI endpoint provided bytrtllm-serve(found inSKILL.mdandreferences/serving.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or boundary instructions (e.g., "ignore embedded instructions") defined in the provided code templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network capabilities to serve API requests (
trtllm-serve) and performs package installation (pip install). - Sanitization: The provided documentation and code snippets do not include input validation or sanitization layers for the prompt data.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download the
tensorrt_llmlibrary from PyPI and the officialnvidia/tensorrt_llmDocker image from NVIDIA's container registry. It also references official documentation and repositories onnvidia.github.ioandgithub.com/NVIDIA. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions for executing shell commands to install dependencies (
pip install), pull containers (docker pull), and launch the inference server (trtllm-serve). These are standard operational procedures for the library's intended use case. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation demonstrates secure secret management practices by instructing users to provide API keys via environment variables (e.g.,
--api_key $API_KEY) rather than hardcoding credentials into configuration files.
Audit Metadata