interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data to define the intent of a review, which is then inserted into the prompt template for reviewer subagents.
- Ingestion points: User messages, commit messages, and PR descriptions are gathered in
SKILL.md(Step 2) to establish the "Intent". - Boundary markers: The
{INTENT}placeholder inREVIEWER-PROMPT.mdis wrapped in a markdown blockquote (>), which is a weak delimiter that can be easily bypassed by adversarial text to hijack the subagent's instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill uses a
subagenttool to invoke other models and performsgit diffoperations via shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the user-provided intent string before it is interpolated into the prompt template.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to identify code changes.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 1 explicitly directs the agent to rungit diff $(git merge-base HEAD origin/HEAD)to gather the changeset for review. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local configuration files to determine which models to use for the review process.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 3 reads~/.config/ox/models.mdto parse thepanelconfiguration. While this is functional for the skill's purpose, accessing files in the user's home directory is a sensitive operation.
Audit Metadata