show-me-your-work
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to access sensitive file paths on the local system that contain user interaction history and configuration data.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to read from~/.claude/projects/,~/.codex/sessions/, and~/.config/ox/models.mdto audit the decision trail. - These paths are highly sensitive as session logs often contain the full history of user prompts and agent responses, potentially including credentials, private logic, or personal information shared during a session.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a process that ingests untrusted data from session logs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Local session history files (e.g.,
.jsonlfiles in~/.claude/projects/). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or requirements for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the transcript data being audited.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem via
scripts/log.shand delegate tasks to subagents. - Sanitization: While the output logger
scripts/log.shsanitizes for spreadsheet formula injection, there is no sanitization or validation performed on the input transcript data before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata