show-me-your-work

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to access sensitive file paths on the local system that contain user interaction history and configuration data.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md directs the agent to read from ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.codex/sessions/, and ~/.config/ox/models.md to audit the decision trail.
  • These paths are highly sensitive as session logs often contain the full history of user prompts and agent responses, potentially including credentials, private logic, or personal information shared during a session.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a process that ingests untrusted data from session logs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Local session history files (e.g., .jsonl files in ~/.claude/projects/).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or requirements for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the transcript data being audited.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem via scripts/log.sh and delegate tasks to subagents.
  • Sanitization: While the output logger scripts/log.sh sanitizes for spreadsheet formula injection, there is no sanitization or validation performed on the input transcript data before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 09:23 AM