why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from untrusted external sources, such as GitHub PRs, issues, long-form documentation, and real-time chat platforms (Discord, Slack, Teams), which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's synthesis.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via
gh pr view,gh search, and various MCP tools used to fetch chat history, documentation, and infrastructure logs as defined inSKILL.mdandSOURCES.md. - Boundary markers: The skill employs Markdown blockquotes within its prompt templates (
INVESTIGATOR-PROMPT.mdandSYNTHESIZER-PROMPT.md) to delimit ingested content, though it lacks programmatic escaping. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
git,gh(GitHub CLI), and multiple MCP tools capable of querying external APIs, observability platforms, and messaging services. - Sanitization: No explicit programmatic sanitization of external content is performed; however, the skill mandates a strict epistemic framework (
EPISTEMICS.md) to guide the LLM toward cautious and evidence-based reasoning, which serves as a mitigation against following embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata