using-designpowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to override the agent's decision-making process, using phrases such as 'IF A SKILL APPLIES TO YOUR TASK, YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE. YOU MUST USE IT.'
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's description uses authoritative directives to force the agent to prioritize this specific sequence, claiming it 'MUST run before any other Designpowers skill.'
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill records user design decisions and 'taste' in a local file (
~/.designpowers/taste-profile.md) to influence agent behavior in future projects. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Processes URLs, screenshots, code snippets, and remote
DESIGN.mdfiles through thedesign-reviewanddesign-libraryskills. - Boundary markers: The instructions suggest treating
DESIGN.mdfiles as data rather than instructions and mentions an 'injection guardrail' for remote content. - Capability inventory: The skill manages a team of agents that can perform file operations (
design-state.md) and generate application code (design-builder). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly mentions a 'fetched file injection guardrail' for external resources.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs sensitive file path access by reading the user's design profile stored in the home directory (
~/.designpowers/taste-profile.md).
Audit Metadata