megalinter-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external CI logs, which could contain malicious instructions intended to mislead the agent. \n
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches logs from GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Azure Pipelines, and Bitbucket Pipelines using CLI tools and APIs. \n
- Capability inventory: Access to shell execution for Git operations and file system writing. \n
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective instructions are used to isolate untrusted log content during parsing. \n
- Sanitization: Log output is parsed for specific markers but not validated or sanitized against prompt injection patterns. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes sensitive Git commands that alter repository history, such as amending commits and force-pushing. \n
- Evidence: Instructions for
git commit --amendandgit push --force-with-leaseare present inSKILL.md. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute setup scripts from external sources. \n - Evidence:
container-engine.mdincludescurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh. \n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requests administrative privileges to install container engines and manage system services. \n - Evidence: Use of
sudo apt-get install,sudo dnf install, andsudo systemctlincontainer-engine.md. \n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically executes remote code through package managers and scripts. \n - Evidence: Use of
npx mega-linter-runnerfor local linting andcurl | shfor Docker installation.
Audit Metadata