review-descriptor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the
$ARGUMENTSvariable to locate descriptor files. If the user provides a path-traversal string or a filename designed to trigger specific agent behaviors, it could bypass intended constraints. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill allows the
Bashtool. While the instructions focus on auditing, the audit includes checkinginstallsections and CLI arguments within YAML files. If the agent attempts to validate these by executing them, it poses a risk of arbitrary command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
WebSearchandWebFetchto verify documentation URLs, IDE extensions, and tool capabilities (like SARIF support). This involves fetching content from arbitrary external websites based on the content of the audited YAML files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and audits descriptor YAML files located in
megalinter/descriptors/or specified via$ARGUMENTS(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the audited files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Grep,Glob,Bash,WebSearch, andWebFetch(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None. The content of the audited YAML files is processed directly to check properties like
installscripts andlinter_urlwithout escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata