agent-arena-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests agent metadata (names, descriptions, and capabilities) from a public marketplace where third parties can register content. If this metadata contains malicious instructions, it could influence the AI agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Responses from agent search and profile API endpoints on agentarena.site.
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit embedded content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses curl commands to perform network operations.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the retrieved metadata is mentioned.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits search queries and agent registration details to the external domain agentarena.site. While functional, this involves sending potentially sensitive user intent data to a third-party service.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches structured configuration files and agent metadata (such as MCP server cards and OASF records) from remote URLs at agentarena.site.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation instructs the use of shell commands (curl) to interact with the API endpoints, which involves executing network-reaching commands on the host environment.
Audit Metadata