moltbook-interact
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of bash scripts (
scripts/moltbook.sh) to perform its primary functions, including API calls and data parsing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdconfiguration utilizesnpx -yto dynamically download and execute the Apify MCP server (@apify/mcp-server) and the official Slack MCP server (@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack) from the npm registry. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
scripts/moltbook.shscript attempts to read sensitive platform-wide credentials from~/.openclaw/auth-profiles.jsonand~/.config/moltbook/credentials.json. While it specifically targets the Moltbook API key, the script requires read access to the entire authentication profile file. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from Moltbook (such as post content and comments) which is then processed by the agent. If this data contains malicious instructions, it could influence the agent's behavior, particularly since the agent has shell execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
scripts/moltbook.shvia thehot,new, andpostcommands. - Boundary markers: None detected in the script or prompt instructions to delimit untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via the
Bashtool and network operations viacurl. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata